A Nigerian lawyer, Christopher Chidera, Esq., has launched a fresh legal challenge to the November 20, 2025 conviction of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leader, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, alleging that the trial judge, Justice James Omotosho, relied on offences and statutory provisions that were not contained in the original charge sheet.
In a strongly worded legal briefing dated October 30, 2026, Chidera questioned the legal foundation of the judgment delivered by the Federal High Court in Abuja, arguing that the court allegedly departed from the prosecution’s original charges and introduced a different basis of criminal liability at the judgment stage.
The briefing, titled “Forensic Legal Briefing: Why Omotosho’s Judgment of 20 November 2025 (FRN v. Mazi Nnamdi Kanu) Is Completely Dead on Arrival,” identifies two major issues which the lawyer believes could have significant implications for Kanu’s ongoing legal battle.
Chidera’s central argument is that an accused person cannot be convicted on a criminal accusation that differs materially from the one formally presented by the prosecution without being given an opportunity to defend against it.
One of the major issues raised in the briefing concerns Count One of the original charge sheet.
According to Chidera, the prosecution charged Kanu under Section 1(2)(b) of the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013 over broadcasts allegedly made in furtherance of an act of terrorism.
However, the lawyer argued that Justice Omotosho’s reasoning in the judgment, particularly on Page 96, treated the broadcast itself as a preparatory act of terrorism.
He maintained that this represented a significant departure from the original formulation of the charge, which, in his interpretation, concerned conduct allegedly undertaken in support or furtherance of another terrorist act.
Using this distinction, Chidera argued that the trial court effectively changed the nature of the criminal liability after the defence had concluded its case.
He described the development as an unlawful substitution of the offence presented by the prosecution with a different theory of criminal responsibility.
The second major issue raised by the lawyer concerns Count Six and the alleged introduction of Section 3 of the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013.
Chidera claimed that Count Six of the original charge sheet specifically referenced Section 1(2)(f), while Section 3, which addresses international terrorism, was not included in the indictment.
He alleged that Justice Omotosho subsequently relied on Section 3 in his final reasoning and referred to its mandatory life-imprisonment punishment in connection with allegations involving threats against foreign diplomatic missions.
The lawyer questioned why the provision featured in the final judgment when, according to his examination of the charge sheet, Kanu had not been formally charged under that section.
He further argued that the defendant was not given a specific opportunity to answer an accusation under Section 3 during the proceedings.
For Chidera, the issue raises a fundamental question about the limits of judicial authority in criminal proceedings: whether a court can introduce a separate statutory offence at the point of delivering judgment.
Central to Chidera’s argument is Section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, which guarantees an accused person the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature of the offence for which they are being tried.
The lawyer maintained that the constitutional guarantee is intended to ensure that defendants understand the allegations against them and have a meaningful opportunity to prepare their defence.
He argued that if a court convicts an accused person on a materially different offence or statutory provision that was never included in the charge, the defendant’s ability to defend the case could be compromised.
Chidera also cited several judicial authorities, including Aoko v. Fagbemi, FRN v. Usman, Okeke v. State and Madukolu v. Nkemdilim, to support his position on the requirements of a valid criminal conviction and the limits of judicial jurisdiction.
He maintained that a trial judge must determine the case presented before the court rather than introduce a new criminal accusation after the conclusion of the defence.
The briefing also examines the potential implications of the arguments for Kanu’s appeal.
Chidera argued that the Court of Appeal would need to examine whether the convictions were supported by the offences contained in the original charge sheet and whether the defendant received the constitutionally required notice of the allegations against him.
He identified two separate issues for appellate consideration: the alleged change in the basis of liability under Count One and the alleged reliance on Section 3 under Count Six.
According to him, an appellate court should not simply disregard these questions without determining whether the trial court’s reasoning remained within the legal framework of the charges before it.
He further argued that an appellate court cannot substitute a new indictment or reconstruct the prosecution’s case to justify a conviction if the original proceedings failed to satisfy constitutional requirements.
Concluding the briefing, the lawyer challenged those defending the judgment to explain how the conviction could stand if the trial court relied on a different basis of criminal liability and a statutory provision that was allegedly absent from the original charge sheet.
He posed the following question:
“How can a conviction stand when the trial judge changed the basis of criminal responsibility from an accessory charge to a primary offence after the defence closed, and imported an uncharged statutory provision under Section 3 of the TPAA 2013 that the accused was never called upon to answer?”
Chidera described the issues as central to the legal challenge against Kanu’s conviction, insisting that the original charge sheet and the final judgment must be examined together.
His submission adds another dimension to the continuing legal debate surrounding the IPOB leader’s conviction, particularly regarding the relationship between criminal charges, judicial findings and the constitutional right to a fair hearing.
